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In Focus: Senior Leader Dissent

Matthew Ridgway and the Value
of Persistent Dissent
Conrad C. Crane
©2021 Conrad C. Crane

ABSTRACT: Army General Matthew Ridgway’s actions throughout
his career provide a valuable example of the appropriate time and
place for serious dissent by military leaders. Ridgway demonstrated
the importance of selectively and pragmatically expressing open
disagreement in response to operational decisions a military leader
deems unnecessarily risk American lives and economic resources.

A

n article in a recent edition of Parameters described General
Matthew Ridgway as a model of the traditional American
approach to military advice to civilian authorities, an officer who
provided unquestioning support for the final national security decisions
of his civilian leadership. Ridgway’s memoir states his civilian superiors:
“ ‘could expect fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective
professional opinion up to the moment when they themselves, the civilian
commanders, announced their decisions. Thereafter, they could expect
completely loyal and diligent execution of those decisions.’ ”1 In the
memoir paragraph before, however, Ridgway notes: “civilian authorities
must scrupulously respect the integrity, the intellectual honesty, of its
officer corps. Any effort to force unanimity of view, to compel adherence
to some political-military ‘party line’ against the honestly expressed views
of responsible officers . . . is a pernicious practice which jeopardizes
rather than protects the integrity of the military profession.”2
Ridgway elaborated on this position in later pages. “I learned early
in my career that it is not enough, when great issues are involved, to
express your views verbally and let it go at that. It is necessary to put
them down in writing, over your signature. In that way they become
part of the historical record.”3 Ridgway believed civilian leaders had the
authority to disagree with military advice and take a different course, but
he also believed they should bear the responsibility for any outcomes. He
condemned “a deliberate effort to soothe and lull the public by placing
responsibility where it did not rest, by conveying the false impression
that there was unanimous agreement between the civilian authorities
and their military advisers.”4

1. John C. Binkley, “Revisiting the 2006 Revolt of the Generals,” Parameters 50, no 1 (Spring
2020): 25, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss1/1/.
2. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway as Told to Harold H. Martin
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 270.
3. Ridgway, Soldier, 287.
4. Ridgway, Soldier, 288.
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Here Ridgway was specifically referring to his open disagreements
with the Eisenhower administration on its New Look defense policies,
which led to his tenure as chief of staff of the Army lasting only two
years. As he also stated in his memoir, “Under no circumstances,
regardless of pressures from whatever source or motive, should the
professional military man yield, or compromise his judgment for other
than convincing military reasons.”5
He applied similar logic to his treatment of directives from his military
superiors. In 1966, Ridgway gave an address at the US Army Command
and General Staff College in which he counseled the assembly about
opposition to orders. He acknowledged military services properly
deal harshly . . . with failure to carry out orders in battle. . . . Yet when faced
with different situations from those anticipated, as well as in the transition
from plans to orders, there sometimes comes the challenge to one’s
conscience, the compelling urge to oppose foolhardy operations before it is
too late, before the orders are issued and lives are needlessly thrown away.6

Ridgway asserted the hardest decisions to make were “those involved
in speaking your mind about some harebrained scheme which proposes
to commit troops to action under conditions where failure seems almost
certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of priceless
lives. . . . For a battle commander to ever condone the unnecessary
sacrifice of his men is inexcusable.” 7 Quoting General George C.
Marshall, he observed, “ ‘It is hard to get men to do this, for this is
when you lay your career, perhaps your commission, on the line.’ ”8
For Ridgway, it did not matter if the “harebrained scheme” came from
civilian or military leaders.
In his 1966 address, Ridgway cited two examples where he battled
to stop “needless sacrifice[s]” while commanding the 82nd Airborne
Division in Italy. In one case, he opposed a proposed attack by his
division across the Volturno River, over open ground with enemy fire
from both flanks and the front, which he considered a suicide mission
with only a small chance of success. He initially discussed his opposition
with General Lucien Truscott of the 3rd Infantry Division, who agreed
with Ridgway’s assessment. Following that discussion, Ridgway took his
complaints to his corps commander, and then to the Army commander,
before finally getting the operation cancelled.9
And opposition based on best military judgment did not cease
just because a decision had been made to execute the operation. In the
second example, Ridgway’s division received orders to drop on Rome
in September 1943 for Operation Giant II, in support of landings in
Salerno. General Sir Harold Alexander, 15th Army Group commander,
told Ridgway he should expect ground forces to link up with him “in
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ridgway, Soldier, 272.
Matthew B. Ridgway, “Leadership,” Military Review 46, no. 10 (October 1966): 44–45.
Ridgway, “Leadership,” 45.
Ridgway, “Leadership,” 45.
Ridgway, “Leadership,” 45.
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three days—five at the most.”10 Assumptions included light opposition
despite six German divisions near the city, and help from the Italians
who were ready to sever their alliance with Germany.
Ridgway was appalled. The mission would place his division outside
the range of supporting fighters and dive-bombers. Moreover, he knew
ground forces would never reach the city in time to save his soldiers
from a dreadful mauling. While his troops continued to prepare for the
operation, Ridgway mounted his campaign to stop it. He reached out
to a strong proponent of the operation, General Walter Bedell Smith,
then chief of staff for the theater commander, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Bedell Smith recommended Ridgway approach Alexander.
While he did not cancel the drop, Alexander did approve the dispatch of
a clandestine delegation, led by Ridgway’s artillery commander Brigadier
General Maxwell Taylor, to Rome to assess Italian preparations. Taylor
was horrified by what he found and sent four cables supporting cancelling
the operation, the last one mere hours before the first aircraft were to
take off.11
By this time, Eisenhower had received further intelligence about the
lack of Italian capability and readiness, and after Taylor’s last message,
Alexander sent an order to Ridgway cancelling Operation Giant II.
But no acknowledgment was received. Eisenhower ordered Brigadier
General Lyman Lemnitzer, Alexander’s American deputy, to deliver the
cancellation order personally to Ridgway by air.
Sixty-two transports were already circling the airfield at Licata
when Lemnitzer arrived, and he started frantically shooting flares to
get everyone’s attention. The takeoffs stopped, Lemnitzer landed, and
he found Ridgway wearing his parachute, preparing to climb into a
C-47. Ridgway had spent the day reconciling himself to an operation
that would destroy his division, after his failed attempts to dissuade his
leadership from this course of action. Immediately, Ridgway recalled
paratroopers in the air, while the rest were returned to their bivouacs.
“Exhausted and relieved, Ridgway stumbled into a tent where one
of his officers sat trembling on a cot. Ridgway poured two drinks
from a whiskey bottle, and as darkness fell and calm again enveloped
Licata South, they sat slumped together, silent but for the sound of
their weeping.”12

Limits of Airpower

In his memoir, Ridgway expresses great pride in contributing to
another of “that list of tragic accidents that fortunately never happened,”
namely, an American intervention to bail out the French in Indochina in
1954, initially with major air attacks.13 The series of events that led to the
10. Ridgway, Soldier, 81.
11. Ridgway, Soldier, 80–82; and D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith,
American Warrior Series (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 502–3.
12. Crosswell, Beetle, 504; and Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–
1944 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 194–95.
13. Ridgway, Soldier, 278.
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death of Operation Vulture began in April 1951 when General Douglas
MacArthur was relieved of his command of UN forces in Korea. Though
UN forces and their airpower had been successful initially in destroying
most of the North Korean People’s Army and reaching the Yalu River,
massive Communist Chinese intervention had driven MacArthur’s
command back down the peninsula in November and December. Only
in February had the rejuvenated Eighth Army under Ridgway begun to
regain the initiative.
By April, public anxiety was high in the United States. Public
opinion polls revealed most Americans favored air attacks on
Manchuria, and a third of those polled advocated general war with
China. President Harry Truman ordered Strategic Air Command
bombers with atomic weapons to Okinawa on April 6, 1951, in response
to a buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East and ominous Chinese air
and ground preparations for their spring offensive. MacArthur’s firing
raised fears the Communists might escalate the war to take advantage
of opportunities created by the change in UN command to Ridgway.
But in May the new commander’s forces stopped the massive Chinese
fifth-phase offensive and began a series of vigorous counterattacks.
Ridgway’s slow but inexorable advance was only stopped by the opening
of armistice negotiations in July.14
After replacing MacArthur and stopping the Communist advance,
Ridgway faced the challenge of negotiating with a difficult enemy
while his military options for leverage at the peace table were limited.
Once battle lines stabilized along an entrenched front and armistice
talks began, he determined airpower would be his best option to exert
coercive military pressure on the enemy. On July 13, 1951, he instructed
his Far East Air Forces (FEAF) and naval air units, “desire action during
this period of negotiations to exploit full capabilities of air power to reap
maximum benefit of our ability to punish enemy wherever he may be
in [Korea].”15
Though Ridgway believed ratcheting up bombing would produce
results at the peace talks, he still had to deal with American leaders in
Washington who did not want to escalate the war any further. They
were particularly sensitive about attacks on major North Korean cities.
On July 21, Ridgway informed the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that
a key part of his plan “for unrelenting pressure on Communist forces”
was “an all out air strike on Pyongyang” with 140 medium and light
bombers and 230 fighters, to be executed on the first clear day after July
24. This operation would “take advantage of the accelerated buildup
14. Mark Andrew O’Neill, “The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War,
Phase One, 1 November 1950–12 April 1951,” (PhD diss., Florida State University, 1996), 273–74;
Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter
1988–1989): 69–79; Roger M. Anders, “The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and
the Issue of Civilian Control,” Military Affairs 52, no. 1 (January 1988): 1–3; and Conrad C. Crane,
“Killing Vultures, Containing Communism, and Venting Pressure: International Impacts of the
Korean War,” Annual War History Research Report 10, no. 3 (2007): 90.
15. Ridgway to Hickey, message, UNC-071, July 13, 1951, file K720.1622, 1950–51, Air Force
Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
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of supplies and personnel” in the area, “strike a devastating blow at
the North Korean capital,” and make up for the many recent sorties
canceled by bad weather.16
Ridgway’s concerns about bad weather proved well founded. When
the all-out attack on Pyongyang was finally mounted on July 30 after
approval by the JCS, deteriorating weather conditions forced the
diversion of light and medium bombers to secondary targets, while
smoke and cloud cover made any assessment of the 620 fighter and
fighter-bomber sorties very difficult. Results were deemed indecisive,
so another full-scale assault on the capital by FEAF Bomber Command
was carried out on August 14, 1951. Two Strategic Air Command B-29
wings had to use radar to deliver bombs through cloud cover. Ridgway
was disappointed with the poor results and collateral civilian casualties,
instructing FEAF to wait for excellent weather for any more major raids.17
Encouraged by his success in gaining JCS permission to bomb
Pyongyang, Ridgway revisited a proposed attack of the port of Rashin,
a city close to the Soviet border. Aerial reconnaissance revealed an
extensive buildup of materiel and supplies that could be funneled south
through the highway and rail complex there. In reply to queries about
his specific plans, Ridgway assured the Joint Chiefs that he would not
violate the border with air strikes.
In this endeavor, Ridgway had the strong support of the US Air
Force Air Staff who thought the raids would hamper enemy supply
buildup and pressure Communist negotiators at the armistice talks by
proving “all of their sanctuaries [were] not privileged.”18 Rashin was
also considered “the last major profitable strategic target in Korea.”19
The Air Staff discounted diplomatic concerns because the Soviets
had not responded to similar attacks. The Joint Chiefs agreed and
obtained presidential approval to authorize the bombing raid. Naval
aircraft provided cover for 35 B-29s who pummeled the port with
300 tons of bombs on August 25 in good weather. No follow-up raids
were necessary.20
16. CINCFE to Subordinate Commands, message, CX 60410, April 19, 1951, section 45;
CINCFE to Subordinate Commands, message, C 61367, April 30, 1951, section 46, box 31; CINCFE
to Subordinate Commands, message, C 67474, July 21, 1951, section 54, box 33, geographic file
1951–53, 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), record group 218, National Archives II, College Park, MD;
Ridgway to Hickey, message, UNC-071, July 13, 1951; and Crane, “Killing Vultures,” 91–92.
17. CINCFE to JCS, message, C 68064, July 31, 1951, box 1, incoming messages, May 29, 1950–
August 3, 1951, RG 218; Terrill to Power, letter, August 16, 1951, file B-12789, box B198, Curtis
LeMay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Matthew B. Ridgway, notes on conference
with General Weyland, August 30, 1951, folder, special file April 1951–January 1952, Matthew B.
Ridgway Papers, US Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, PA.
18. Joseph Smith to General Vandenberg, memorandum, “Removal of Restriction against
Attacks on Najin (Rashin),” file OPD 381 Korea (May 9, 1947), section 12, box 894, RG 341.
19. Joseph Smith to General Vandenberg, memorandum (May 9, 1947).
20. JCS 1776/244 with enclosures, “Removal of Restriction Against Attacks on Najin
(Rashin),” August 10, 1951, section 57, box 33, geographic file 1951–53, 383.21 Korea (3-19-45),
RG 218; Joseph Smith to General Vandenberg, memorandum (May 9, 1947); United States Air Force
Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952, US Air Force Historical Study No. 72
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air Force Historical Division, Air University, July 1, 1955), 145.
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Ultimately, the increased use of airpower had no impact on the
armistice talks. Even after his attempts to influence negotiations that
summer, Ridgway’s air priorities remained focused on coercing through
interdiction, a difficult task in Korea in 1951, but the best he thought he
could accomplish with the limitations on military operations imposed
by the Joint Chiefs. The FEAF did not have enough aircraft or the
proper technology to interdict at night, while the enemy had plenty of
labor to repair damage to communication lines.21 Further, the reduced
military activity during the armistice negotiations meant the Communist
adversaries required fewer supplies.
UN air forces did their best to meet Ridgway’s expectations. With
US Navy air support, FEAF tried three different programs in 1951 to
interdict the logistics of Communist armies, yet they all failed, and for
different reasons. The first, Interdiction Plan No. 4, targeted North
Korean rail lines but was too ambitious. Bomber Command successfully
closed 27 of 39 assigned marshalling yards and took out 48 of 60 targeted
bridges, but B-29 losses were heavy, and the rail system proved too
resilient to be paralyzed effectively.
When the massive spring offensives showed the inadequacies of
that approach, FEAF shifted to Operation Strangle, focusing primarily
on the North Korean road network. US Navy, Marine, and Air Force
aircraft were assigned different sectors to bomb. They cratered roads,
dispersed tetrahedral tacks to destroy tires, and dropped delayed action
bombs to deter repair crews, with more disappointing results. The
enemy bypassed blockages, accepted casualties to complete repairs, and
exploited the lack of effective UN night bombing capability by moving
after dark. The FEAF came to regret the name of the operation, as it
raised exorbitant expectations.
In August 1951, still another campaign was initiated, the Rail
Interdiction Program, though many Air Force officers and the press
still referred to it as Strangle. This effort was better organized and more
effective. Carrier aircraft targeted east coast rail lines while Bomber
Command attacked bridges. Swarming FEAF fighter bombers cut
lines all over North Korea. Some rail lines were abandoned as enemy
repair crews could not keep up with the pace of destruction. Far East
Air Forces planners began to believe that limited Communist truck
resources might force the enemy to pull back from its positions along
the 38th parallel.22
But that was not to be, as enemy countermeasures, such as building
duplicate bridges at key crossing points and caching whole bridge
21. Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars
(Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 289–319.
22. Mark, Aerial Interdiction; O’Neill, “The Other Side,” 281–85; US Pacific Fleet Commander in
Chief, Interim Third Evaluation Report, 1 May–31 December 1951 (Washington, DC: US Naval Historical
Center), 10-45–10-46; HQ Far East Air Forces (FEAF), FEAF Report on the Korean War, 25 June
1950–27 July 1953, book I, 77, file K720.04D, AFHRA; “The Aerial War during Operation Strangle,”
vol. 1, 12–17; and “Notes on Use of the Term ‘Operation Strangle’,” vol. 3, appendix 2, in History
of the Fifth Air Force, 1 July–31 December 1951, file K730.01, AFHRA.
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sections for quick repairs, again turned the tide. Intelligence reports
estimated as many as 500,000 soldiers and civilians maintained
transportation routes. Increased antiaircraft defenses appeared around
key targets, and enemy MiG jet fighters operating from Manchuria
became more aggressive. By September 1951, Soviet and Chinese MiGs
outnumbered F-86 Sabres in the theater 500 to 90. The enemy interceptors
drove back FEAF fighter-bombers, shooting down enough B-29s by
October to force Bomber Command from the daytime skies. These
actions further reduced Ridgway’s ability to maintain pressure effectively
on enemy forces and supply lines and thus to influence negotiations.23
Ultimately, Ridgway’s hopes he could use airpower to prevent
the enemy from building up supplies proved false, and he became
disillusioned with Air Force capability claims. He once told his air
commanders, “If all the enemy trucks you report as having destroyed
during the past ten days or so were actually kills, then there would not
be a truck left in all of Asia.”24
Further, the ineffectiveness of interdiction campaigns was not the
only reason Ridgway disagreed strongly with Air Force claims of its
decisive role in the Korean War. He noted ground forces accounted
for 97 percent of battle casualties, and their performance “determined
the success or failure of the United Nations effort, which in turn
determined the course of United States and United Nations policy.”25
In his Korean War memoirs, he gave the Air Force credit for its essential
support to ground operations and saving UN forces from disaster
early in the war, but he also cautioned against expecting “miracles of
interdiction” from airpower in future conflicts.26
As the months passed, Ridgway’s frustration with the armistice talks
persisted. His battles with the Joint Chiefs over the bombing of Rashin
and Pyongyang and the ineffectiveness of the interdiction campaigns
had tempered Ridgway’s initial determination to use airpower to coerce
enemy negotiators. The Communist armies twice broke off talks, citing
air attacks on the site of the talks—once due to apparently faked evidence
and once because of an actual UN bombing error—and Ridgway was
thereby reluctant to raise the stakes and risk further stalled negotiations.
Accordingly, he would not approve orders to expand target sets to
include hydroelectric dams along the Yalu River, courses of action his
successor, General Mark Clark, would pursue.

23. William F. Dean, General Dean’s Story (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 272–73; J. Lawton
Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 313;
Mark, Aerial Interdiction, 312–14; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean
War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 176–81; and Brigadier General Joe
Kelly to LeMay, letters, October 29, 1971 and November 7, 1951, file FEAF 1, box 65, Curtis LeMay
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
24. M. B. Ridgway to Colonel Paul Carter, letter, December 15, 1976, folder C, 1964–1983,
post retirement A–G, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAHEC.
25. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, repr. (New York: Da Capo, 1986), viii.
26. Mark, Aerial Interdiction; M. B. Ridgway to Colonel Paul Carter, letter, December 15, 1976;
and Ridgway, Korean War, 191, 244.
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In May 1952 Ridgway left the Far East to become Supreme Allied
Commander Europe. He retained a strong skepticism about the
utility of airpower alone that would have a significant impact on his
future actions.27
As chief of staff of the Army from 1953–55, Ridgway’s
disillusionment with the capabilities of airpower in limited war was
evident in his attitudes about New Look defense policies favoring the
Air Force and possible intervention in Indochina to assist the French.
Upon learning the Eisenhower administration was considering air
intervention alone to save the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien
Phu and help them defeat the Viet Minh, he expressed fears the United
States had already forgotten the “bitter lesson” from Korea “that air and
naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces
cannot win one either.”28 He was determined to avoid “making that
same tragic error” in Indochina.29

Killing the Vulture

Planning for Operation Vulture (Vautour) began in earnest in
mid-April 1954. On a routine liaison visit to Vietnam, FEAF commander
General Earle Partridge was informed by the French that the aerial
operation to save Dien Bien Phu had been cleared through diplomatic
channels. Partridge had received no information regarding the approval
of the operation; nonetheless, he ordered the chief of FEAF Bomber
Command, Brigadier General Joseph Caldera, to prepare a contingency
plan. Bomber Command still had its wartime contingent of B-29s for
a mass strike, but Caldera foresaw many problems with the operation
when he flew to Vietnam to confer with the French, including the
fact there were “no true B-29 targets” in the area, and bad monsoon
weather necessitated the use of radar guidance systems the French did
not possess.30
Opposition to Vulture, however, would soon obviate the need
for such planning. Ridgway led the effort against it in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, galvanized by the fact that the chairman, Admiral Arthur
Radford, supported the mission. Radford’s high-handed tactics to
coerce Ridgway to accede to New Look policies had poisoned relations
between the two men. Ridgway considered the New Look “a misguided
policy that endangered the nation’s security.”31 He forthrightly expressed

27. Ridgway, Korean War, 200, 202, 244.
28. Ridgway, Soldier, 277.
29. Ridgway, Korean War, viii; Ridgway, Soldier, 277.
30. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (New York: Free Press,
1985), 205–6; and George C. Herring, America‘s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950–1975,
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 1986), 31.
31. A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1986), 22.
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such opinions in congressional hearings, which pleased Democratic
opposition and eventually made him persona non grata with Eisenhower.32
Ridgway was just as forthright about his position on helping the
French in March 1954 when the issue arose at a gathering for General
Paul Ely, the French chief of the armed forces staff, at Radford’s
home. Ely was in Washington to garner additional aid due to the dire
situations at Dien Bien Phu and in Indochina. When the supportive
Radford asked if the French just needed more airpower for success,
Ridgway challenged the assertion before Ely could reply. He noted in
his diary afterward, “the experience of Korea, where we had complete
domination of the air and a far more powerful air force, afforded no
basis for thinking that some additional air power was going to bring
decisive results on the ground.”33
Ridgway then mobilized the rest of the Joint Chiefs so when
Radford advocated his proposition to support the French a few days
later, they were unified in opposition to it. The chairman then asked for
the written views of each chief. Ridgway’s carefully crafted argument
about the costs and strategic risks of possible involvement in Indochina
was eventually sent to the secretary of defense. Ridgway also ordered
his director of operations, Major General James Gavin, to send a team
to the theater to gauge its conditions. They returned with a bleak report
highlighting inadequate support facilities, massive logistic difficulties
in the theater, the number of troops required for operations, and the
impact on strategic reserves.
Implicit in these calculations was the assumption that airpower
alone would not save the French and defeat the Viet Minh. Ridgway
exploited his connections in France from his time as the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe to monitor additional French requests for support,
using the inside information to keep the other chiefs aligned with
him, especially Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining.
Eventually Ridgway prepared a briefing for the National Security
Council and asked to deliver it with President Eisenhower in attendance.
When Ely returned to make a final plea for support after the fall of Dien
Bien Phu in May, Ridgway still did not trust Radford. Consequently, he
convinced the other chiefs to agree that no member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff could meet with Ely alone.34
Ridgway’s arguments from the June 1954 National Security Council
briefing, which could be summed up as “ten divisions and ten years”
32. Bacevich, Pentomic Era, 41; and A. J. Bacevich, “The Paradox of Professionalism:
Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953–1955,” Journal of Military History
61 (April 1997): 303–33.
33. Matthew B. Ridgway, memorandum, “Conversation at Home of Admiral Radford,
March 22, 1954,” Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAHEC.
34. Arthur Radford, memoranda for the secretary of defense, March 31 and April 22, 1954;
Matthew B. Ridgway, memoranda for JCS, April 2 and 6, 1954; James M. Gavin, “Military
Consequences of Various Courses of Action with Respect to Application of U.S. Military Forces
in Indochina”; Matthew B. Ridgway, memoranda for record, April 28 and May 17, 1954; and
Matthew B. Ridgway Chief of Staff of the US Army to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 7, 1954, “Projected
Conversations Here with General Ely, French Army,” Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAHEC.
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to win in Indochina, even without Chinese intervention, appeared
in an article in US News & World Report that same month. The article
argued more soldiers would be necessary to fight in Indochina than in
Korea, and defense budgets would skyrocket while draft requirements
quadrupled. The lack of reliable allies and bases would complicate
“almost insurmountable” logistic problems, while jungle warfare would
nullify any American advantages in “mechanized, mobile equipment.”35
Ridgway’s comments were probably leaked by members of Eisenhower’s
staff, to use the arguments of another respected military commander to
support the president’s decision not to intervene.
Ridgway was not the only leader in Washington strongly opposed
to unilateral aid to the French. Key congressmen in early April 1954
also showed little confidence in the air option, warning, “once the flag
is committed, the use of land forces would surely follow.”36 They also
demanded Great Britain and other Allies participate in a collective
intervention. Democratic Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia led the
congressional opposition to Operation Vulture. Ridgway viewed him
as an ally in his efforts to stay out of Indochina, as Russell certainly
remembered the acrimonious debates about inflated expectations
of airpower when he chaired the May 1951 joint hearings following
Truman’s firing of MacArthur.37
The death knell for Operation Vulture was the refusal of Great
Britain to be drawn into “Radford’s war against China.”38 American and
French talks on intervention continued after the fall of Dien Bien Phu
in early May, but no serious plans resulted. Historians such as George
Herring and Richard Immerman believe Eisenhower was more willing
to intervene than he admitted later in his memoirs.39 Others, such as
Melanie Billings-Yun, think Eisenhower never wanted to intervene
militarily but could not afford to take that position openly without
weakening France’s motivation to win the war and without bringing
into question America’s commitment to the security of Southeast Asia.40
If Billings-Yun is right, lessons of the Korean air war were fresh
enough in 1954 to help inspire a vocal opposition that reinforced the
president’s inclination to avoid direct military involvement in Indochina.
If Herring and Immerman are correct, then that opposition may have
35. “What Ridgway Told Ike—War in Indo-China Would Be Tougher Than Korea,” US News
& World Report, June 25, 1954, 30–32.
36. George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu:
‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’ Revisited,” Journal of American History 71, no. 2 (September
1984): 353.
37. United States Senate, “Constitutional Crisis Averted,” Historical Highlights, May 3,
1951, United States Senate (website), https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute
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changed his mind by demonstrating just how perilous and divisive even
a limited aerial intervention would be. Ridgway wrote of his role:
When the day comes for me to face my Maker and account for my actions,
the thing I would be most humbly proud of was the fact that I fought
against, and perhaps contributed to preventing, the carrying out of some
harebrained tactical schemes which would have cost the lives of thousands
of men. To that list of tragic incidents that fortunately never happened I
would add the Indo-China intervention.41

Leadership Legacies

A decade later when problems in Indochina again tempted American
involvement, Ridgway was no longer in a position of responsibility or
influence. His independence and outspoken ways as Army chief of staff
led to his early retirement in 1955, his fate an echo of Marshall’s warnings
about strong dissent. Ridgway’s only available option was to warn
belatedly in articles and a book about unclear political objectives and
caution about the limitations of airpower and difficulties of operations
in Indochina.42
It is ironic that the retired Army general who had the ears of
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson was instead Taylor,
Ridgway’s successor and an enthusiastic advocate of intervention in
Vietnam. As Army chief of staff, Taylor also opposed Eisenhower’s
New Look policies, but he was not as openly combative. Instead he let
Gavin lead the opposition and had a clandestine group of colonels in
the G-3 write articles and leak information to undermine the president’s
security initiatives. Eventually the officers were discovered, and Taylor
was told to relieve them. He did, but he also gave them plum follow-on
assignments, appreciating the fact they had taken the fall for him. Due
to these firings and his more muted dissent, he was able to maintain his
position in both Kennedy’s and Johnson’s inner circles when important
decisions were being made about Vietnam in the 1960s.43
In retrospect, US involvement in Vietnam may have proved more
efficacious in 1954, when Communist forces were not as organized or
well supplied and China was still reeling from the Korean War. But the
United States was not prepared for a major conflict there. All Ridgway’s
arguments against intervention in 1954 remained valid 10 years later, but
he was no longer in a position to make such a pitch to national leaders.
One of the other cautions about persistent and career-risking dissent on
important issues is that the effort can turn into “falling on your sword,”
and you can only do that once.
Yet there are times when such risks should be taken, especially in
the face of significant risks to American lives and resources. In January
41. Ridgway, Soldier, 278.
42. Matthew B. Ridgway, “Pull-out, All-out, or Stand Fast in Vietnam?” Look, April 5, 1966,
81–84; Ridgway, Korean War, 244.
43. David T. Fautua, “The Inconsonant Culture: Ridgway, Taylor, and the Proper Role in
Civil-Military Relations” (paper, Conference of Army Historians, June 19, 1996); Bacevich, Pentomic
Era, 42–46.
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2004, Michael O’Hanlon strongly condemned Army leaders for carrying
out a plan to invade Iraq they knew was deeply flawed. He argued they
knew the post-conflict preparations were lacking and were obligated
to find some way to fix Operation Iraqi Freedom or refuse to execute
it.44 Even Ridgway would not have advocated that course of action,
but perhaps General Eric Shinseki, who voiced his concerns about
occupation forces in an infamous February 2003 Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing, could have benefitted from adopting some aspects
of Ridgway’s 1954 playbook.
As with any historical analogy, there are many key differences. Post
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
the Army chief of staff position has not been as powerful as it was in
1954, and in 2003, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept a
tight rein on information flow in the Pentagon. But perhaps Shinseki
could have mobilized the other chiefs in support of his position and
prepared a strong memorandum about his concerns for the historical
record. He also might have considered Senator Carl Levin—chair of the
committee—who asked the hard questions during the February hearing,
as an ally in his efforts to adjust force levels.
There might have been career implications, but Shinseki had already
been all but fired and his successor designated. The Army chief, however,
instead chose to follow the “traditional model,” and after the Senate
hearing kept the rest of his concerns private even after scathing public
rebuttals from the secretary of defense and his key subordinates.45 We
will never know whether more persistent and open dissent could have
made a difference or not. It may have forced adjustments to the invasion
plan, or such dissent may have soured civil-military relations further.
Too much dissent certainly has the potential to make the deliverer
appear to be obstructionist or not a team player. Even Ridgway
advocated strong resistance in only extreme cases. But there are times
when a military leader’s responsibility to the nation and their profession
to give best military advice and preserve precious lives and economic
resources outweigh operational or political considerations. Such
occasions are rare, but the consequences of weak acquiescence in these
situations could be catastrophic. The careful allocation of dissent is yet
another burden strategic-level leaders must bear as they rise in the ranks
of national decision making.
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